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OPINION OF THE COURT
                        
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
A jury convicted Theresa Smith of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent
to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine and the District Court sentenced her to the
mandatory minimum of ten years imprisonment.  Smith appeals both her conviction and
sentence.  We are not persuaded that either the jury’s verdict or the sentence imposed
should be set aside, and will therefore affirm.
I.
This case arises from Smith’s involvement with a drug conspiracy operating out of
Houston, Texas that distributed large quantities of cocaine in Michigan, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania.  Smith met Roy Mercer, the figure at the center of the conspiracy, in 1992
at a hair salon where Mercer worked and Smith had her hair done.  Over time, they
became close friends and began to see each other outside the salon several times a month. 
Their children played together, they visited each other’s homes, and Mercer would
occasionally borrow Smith’s car.  Smith once took her children and Mercer’s children to
Disneyland; Mercer sometimes gave Smith marital advice.
3Though Mercer had been a hair stylist when Smith met him, he began selling
drugs in 1995.  By 1997, Mercer had stopped working as a stylist altogether and his
primary source of income derived from drug sales.  Several of Mercer’s relatives were a
part of his distribution network, including his niece, sister, and brother.  Mercer’s lifelong
friend, Terrence Tarver, purchased substantial amounts of cocaine from him for
distribution in Ohio and Pennsylvania.  Christopher Smith (not related to Theresa Smith)
was a courier for Tarver and a drug dealer in his own right in Pennsylvania.  Mercer,
Tarver, Christopher Smith, and several other members of the conspiracy were indicted,
pled guilty, and testified for the government at Theresa Smith’s trial.
Smith began working for Continental Airlines as a customer service agent and
ground crew member in 1994 and became a flight attendant with the Airline in 1999. 
The government presented evidence at trial that Smith used her employment at the airline
to facilitate Mercer’s drug distribution.  Witnesses testified that Smith introduced Mercer
to Continental employees who agreed to smuggle drugs onto planes; that she sold
Continental Airlines “buddy pass tickets,” intended for use by an employee’s friends or
family, to members of the conspiracy so that they could cheaply transport drugs and
avoid suspicion by authorities; that Smith often gave members of the conspiracy rides to
the airport when they were about to carry drugs on planes; and that Smith herself
transported drugs to the airport to be smuggled on Continental flights.  There was also
testimony that it was common knowledge among those who knew Mercer well that he
4was heavily engaged in drug trafficking.  Finally, law enforcement agents testified that on
June 23, 1999 Smith met a drug courier in Mercer’s network at the Detroit Metropolitan
Airport and identified for the courier a suitcase containing eleven kilograms of cocaine
that Mercer had sent on the same plane that Smith had been on.
Mercer himself provided conflicting testimony about Smith’s involvement in the
conspiracy.  He emphasized that Smith had nothing to do with his distribution network,
even as he acknowledged that Smith had facilitated the conspiracy’s success in several
ways.  Mercer testified that any involvement in the conspiracy on Smith’s part was the
product of his manipulation, not her knowing participation in drug distribution.  Smith
testified on her own behalf that she did not know Mercer was a drug dealer.  In addition,
she denied introducing Mercer to airline employees who would help him smuggle drugs
or facilitating the transportation of baggage on Continental for Mercer.
The jury returned a guilty verdict against Smith on November 22, 2004.  The
District Court denied Smith’s motion for a new trial and sentenced her to the mandatory
statutory minimum of ten years imprisonment.  We have jurisdiction over Smith’s appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  
II.
Smith appeals her conviction on three grounds.  First, she argues that there is
insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that she knew of the specific object of
the conspiracy and knowingly participated in it.  Second, she claims that the District
5Court erred by providing a willful blindness charge to the jury in light of the evidence
produced at trial.  Third, she contends that the jury produced an internally inconsistent
verdict by finding that Smith both intentionally joined the conspiracy and was willfully
blind to her participation in it.  We reject each of these arguments.
A.
To prove conspiracy, the government must show that there was “an agreement,
either explicit or implicit, to commit an unlawful act, combined with intent to commit an
unlawful act, combined with intent to commit the underlying offense.”  United States v.
Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 134 (3d Cir. 2005).  The alleged conspirators must share a “unity
of purpose,” the intent to achieve a common goal, and an agreement to work together
towards that goal.  United States v. Cartwright, 359 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2004).  We
have held that this requires an alleged conspirator to have knowledge of the specific
objective of the conspiracy.  Cartwright, 359 F.3d at 286-87; United States v. Idowu, 157
F.3d 265, 266-67 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 403, 405 (3d Cir.
1997).  While each element of the offense must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the
government may prove them entirely by circumstantial evidence.  Brodie, 403 F.3d at
134.
Smith argues that she lacked a “unity of purpose” with her alleged co-conspirators
because she was unaware of the conspiracy’s objective and did not intend to achieve its
goal.  She contends that the record does not demonstrate that she knew that her alleged
6co-conspirators were distributing drugs.  She points to evidence that she never actually
saw the drugs in the suitcases she allegedly helped transport, that she did not know that
members of the conspiracy used her “buddy pass tickets” to transport drugs, and that she
drove members of the conspiracy to the airport without knowing that they were carrying
drugs.  Without sufficient evidence that she knew that the purpose of the conspiracy and
intentionally facilitated its objective, Smith argues that the jury’s verdict must be
overturned.  See Cartwright, 359 F.3d at 288 (overturning conspiracy conviction where
government showed that defendant helped facilitate an illicit transaction, but did not
prove defendant knew the specific nature of the transaction).
A claim of insufficiency of the evidence places a very heavy burden on an
appellant.  United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1995).  The critical
inquiry is whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979). 
This is a particularly deferential standard of review.  Cartwright, 359 F.3d at 285-86.  We
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution, Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318, and
will overturn the verdict only where the prosecution’s failure is clear, United States v.
Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 855 (3d Cir. 1997).  We must sustain the verdict if there is
substantial evidence in the record to support the jury’s decision, keeping in mind that it is
not our role to weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses.  Cartwright,
359 F.3d at 286.
7Under this standard, we find that there was sufficient evidence before the jury to
support its verdict.  Mercer and Tarver stated at trial that Smith knew they were drug
dealers, that this information was in fact common knowledge, and that Smith was often
present at the apartment out of which Mercer ran his drug business.  The record is replete
with evidence that would support an inference by the jury that Smith participated in the
conspiracy knowing its objective.  According to trial testimony, she aided Mercer in
various ways that seemed to be obviously related to the distribution of drugs.  She
facilitated the transportation of baggage on planes outside of normal airline procedures,
sold “buddy pass tickets” to people that were very likely traveling in furtherance of the
conspiracy, drove known drug dealers around Houston during their dealings with Mercer,
and, at Mercer’s request, identified a suitcase that contained cocaine for a drug courier at
the Detroit Metropolitan Airport.  Witnesses testified that Smith personally transported
bags containing drugs to the airport so that they could be smuggled onto Continental
flights.  There was also evidence that Smith received money from Mercer and Tarver for
her efforts.
Certain aspects of the record support Smith’s contention that she did not
knowingly join the drug conspiracy.  Mercer testified that Smith never took bags to the
airport for him and that she had no part of the conspiracy.  Several witnesses who
testified that Smith helped transport bags of drugs on planes also acknowledged that the
bags were closed and locked prior to the time Smith took them into her possession,
8suggesting that she may not have seen the drugs herself.  And much of the testimony
against Smith came from witnesses whose own sentences had the potential to be reduced
based on their cooperation with the government.  Yet, we must make all reasonable
inferences in the government’s favor at this stage and may not weigh the evidence or
make credibility determinations ourselves.  We therefore find substantial evidence in the
record to sustain the jury’s verdict.
Smith relies heavily on our line of decisions in Cartwright, Idowu, and Thomas;
however, we find these cases distinguishable from the one before us.  In those cases, each
defendant was convicted of conspiracy based on his participation in an isolated illicit
transaction, the specific nature of which (i.e., drugs versus some other contraband) was
not necessarily known to the defendant.  We overturned the convictions because the
defendants’ mere involvement in the illegal transactions could not have supported an
inference that they knew the objective of the conspiracies of which the transactions were
a part.  See Cartwright, 359 F.3d at 288; Idowu, 157 F.3d at 268; Thomas, 114 F.3d at
406.  By contrast, the record here shows that Smith had longstanding relationships with
Mercer and his co-conspirators, knew that the object of their conspiracy was to distribute
drugs, and maintained ongoing involvement with the conspiracy.  We will not set aside
her conviction under these circumstances.
B.
The District Court instructed the jury that Smith could be found to have joined the
9conspiracy if the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith had
deliberately ignored the high probability that she was participating in a drug conspiracy
and that her participation furthered the conspiracy’s aims.  Smith does not challenge the
adequacy of this willful blindness instruction as it was worded, but rather the propriety of
giving it in her case.  She claims that the evidence presented at trial did not justify the
charge at all.  “Our review of a challenge to the propriety of the willful blindness
instruction is plenary.  In evaluating the charge, we view the evidence and the inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the government.”  United States v. Wert-
Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).  We will uphold a willful
blindness charge if it is supported by sufficient evidence.  United States v. Stewart, 185
F.3d 112, 126 (3d Cir. 1999).
There was more than enough in the record to support a willful blindness
instruction in this case.  A reasonable jury could have concluded that Smith repeatedly
helped smuggle Mercer’s bags onto airplanes but intentionally did not inquire into the
contents of the bags, or into why Mercer might need such an unorthodox method of
shipping, because she wanted to avoid actual knowledge.  Had the jury credited
testimony that Smith only handled the bags of cocaine after they were closed, it could
have concluded that she deliberately did so to avoid specific knowledge of their contents. 
There was also evidence to suggest that Smith had introduced Mercer to airport
employees who could “help him out,” without ever inquiring what sort of “help” he
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needed.  Such evidence, together with testimony that Smith knew that Mercer sold drugs,
was sufficient to support the willful blindness charge.  The jury could have reasonably
interpreted the record as showing that Smith deliberately ignored the high probability that
she was participating in a drug conspiracy.  See Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d at 256 (upholding
propriety of willful blindness charge in light of potential jury interpretations of the
evidence). 
C.
The jury found that (1) Smith intentionally and with actual knowledge joined the
conspiracy, and (2) she was willfully blind to her participation in the conspiracy.  Smith
argues that this verdict was internally inconsistent and that she should receive a new trial. 
Smith urges that she could have either intentionally joined the conspiracy or have been
willfully blind to her participation in it, but not both.
We are not convinced that the jury’s verdict was necessarily internally
inconsistent.  This conspiracy extended over several years, and the jury could have
reasonably concluded that Smith was originally willfully blind to her participation in it,
but later gained actual knowledge that she was aiding in Mercer’s drug distribution. 
However, even assuming that the verdict was internally inconsistent, a new trial is not
warranted here.  An allegedly inconsistent verdict does not necessitate a new trial if there
is sufficient evidence to support each of the jury’s findings.  United States v. Powell, 469
11
U.S. 57, 67 (1984).  We concluded in the preceding sections that there was sufficient
evidence to support a guilty verdict either on an actual knowledge or a willful blindness
theory.  Consequently, there is no reason to set aside the verdict based on an alleged jury
error.
III.
Smith raises two objections to her sentence.  First, she claims that the District
Court should have sentenced her below the mandatory minimum by applying the “safety
valve” provisions set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2.  Second, she
argues that a mandatory ten-year-term of imprisonment for a first time offender convicted
of conspiracy violates the Eighth Amendment.  We are not persuaded by either of these
arguments.
A.
A defendant has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
safety valve provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 apply.  United
States v. Sabir, 117 F.3d 750, 754 (3d Cir. 1997).  Of the five requirements that must be
fulfilled for a district court to apply the provisions, only the fifth is at issue in this case. 
This requirement is satisfied when, “not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the
defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the
defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of
conduct or of a common scheme or plan.”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5).  
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On the day of her sentencing hearing, Smith met with government attorneys to
provide them with all the information she knew about the conspiracy.  Her statement was
largely consistent with the testimony she had given during her trial.  In particular, she
continued to deny that she had knowledge of the conspiracy or any significant contact
with its participants.  Smith also testified at her sentencing hearing that, while in
hindsight she realized that she should have known Mercer was a drug dealer, she did not
realize this during her involvement with him.  Based on the contrary evidence presented
on these points at trial, the District Court found that Smith had not been truthful.  The
Court found that several of her claims at sentencing were not credible, including her
assertion that she did not know that Mercer was a drug dealer, that she did not help
smuggle suitcases onto planes, and that she did not drive members of the conspiracy to
facilitate their drug transactions with Mercer.  The District Court concluded that Smith
had intentionally joined the conspiracy and had therefore not provided truthful
information to the government as required under the safety valve provisions.
We may reject the District Court’s finding that Smith did not provide all the
information and evidence she had related to her offense only if this conclusion was
clearly erroneous.  Sabir, 117 F.3d at 752.  Under this standard, we will uphold the
District Court’s finding.  As discussed above, the government presented several witnesses
at trial who testified as to Smith’s actual knowledge of the conspiracy and intentional
participation in it.  The District Court credited this evidence, and we will not set aside its
13
decision to do so.  See Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 248, 254
(3d Cir. 2005) (“[W]here findings of fact are based on live testimony, ‘due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.’”
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a))).  The District Court’s finding that Smith was not truthful,
and the safety valve provisions therefore inapplicable, was “plausible in light of the
record.”   Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).  
B.
Finally, Smith contends that her ten-year sentence was grossly disproportional to
her crime and therefore violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment.  See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (finding life
imprisonment without parole for a nonviolent recidivist who passed a bad check for $100
violated the Eighth Amendment).  Smith faces an uphill battle on this point.  
As a general matter, we give substantial deference to Congress’s judgment on how
a given crime should be punished.  See United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 247 (3d
Cir. 2006) (deferring to the broad legislative authority to determine the types and limits
of punishments for crimes); United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 723 n.12 (3d Cir.
1993) (recognizing “the primacy of the legislature in making laws which reflect the moral
and social priorities operative in theories of punishment and sentencing”).  “Outside the
context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular
sentences have been exceedingly rare.”  Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980); see
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also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003) (“The gross disproportionality principle
reserves a constitutional violation for only the extraordinary case.”)  Thus, the Supreme
Court has rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole for a defendant convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine, far less
than the quantity of drugs distributed by the conspiracy with which Smith was involved. 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-96 (1991).  Likewise, other courts of appeals
have upheld ten-year mandatory minimum sentences for drug convictions.  See United
States v. Cyrus, 890 F.2d 1245, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (rejecting claim that mandatory
ten-year sentence for possession of over fifty grams of cocaine base was disproportionate
to the crime); United States v. Hoyt, 879 F.2d 505, 513 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding ten-
year mandatory minimum sentence for first time drug conviction against Eighth
Amendment claim).  
Smith’s sentence is undoubtedly severe, particularly in light of her continued
assertion that she was, at most, tangentially involved in the drug conspiracy.  However,
given the case law on this issue, we cannot say that Smith’s sentence was so
disproportionate to her crime as to have been unconstitutional.  See United States v.
Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding that ten-year mandatory minimum
sentence for conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine did not violate the
Eighth Amendment).
* * * * *
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For the reasons set forth, we reject Smith’s arguments and will affirm both the
conviction and sentence.  
